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Abstract: It is widely believed that the lack of bipartisanship between the 
executive and legislative branches in the United States is deleterious to policy 
making. However, a divided government is perhaps more productive than a 
unified government because it can facilitate electoral gains for the minority party. 
Policy created by a divided government can be seen as the collaborative outcome 
of the majority and minority parties, but that of a unified government is perceived 
as the exclusive work of the majority party. Further, successful policy making 
on the part of the unified government could have the effect of compromising the 
minority party’s brand. Thus, the minority party has more incentive to negotiate 
with the majority party and participate in policy making in a divided government. 
To the extent that party brand name assumes greater importance in elections in 
a polarized political system, a divided government could be more conducive to 
policy making than a unified government.
Keywords: policymaking productivity, divided government, polarization, party 
conflict, political cooperation
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, many studies have discussed the negative effect of a divided 
government on policy-making productivity in the United States. They emphasize 
the role of political parties in bringing the executive and legislative branches 
together and identify a divided government as the main culprit of legislative grid-
lock (Binder, 1999, 2003; Coleman, 1999; Sundquist, 1988). James L. Sundquist 
  * Jongkon Lee(Associate Professor) Department of Political Science and International 
Relations, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea. E-mail: jongkonlee@ewha.ac.kr.
Manuscript received February 10, 2020; out for review February 20, 2020; review completed June 01, 
2020; accepted June 02, 2020.
Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2020), pp. 25-46.
© 2020 by the GSPA, Seoul National University
26   Jongkon Lee
Korean Journal of Policy Studies
(1988, p. 614) for example, describes political parties “as the indispensable instru-
ment that brought cohesion and unity, and hence effectiveness, to the government 
as a whole by linking the executive and legislative branches in a bond of common 
interest.” Additionally, it has been suggested that party polarization, although it 
might serve to unify political parties, inflates the negative effect of a divided gov-
ernment on policy-making productivity (Jacobson, 2013; Barber & McCarty, 2016; 
Metzger, 2015; Lee, 2013).1 
Despite that, recent studies have intimated that a divided government may be 
more productive than—not just as productive as—a unified government in the 
United States. For example, Baumgartner et al. (2014) have argued that the quanti-
ty of policies generated by weakly divided governments (such as one in which the 
president’s party is in the minority in one chamber) may be greater than that of uni-
fied ones, even if the quality is not. Gray and Jenkins (2017) conducted several 
regression tests on policy-making productivity that showed that the coefficient of a 
unified government was negative, even though the variable was statistically insig-
nificant. Likewise, according to Ansolabehere, Palmer, & Schneer (2017), divided 
governments have become more productive quantitatively compared with unified 
ones in recent decades: on average, from 1989 to 2009, 483.4 pieces of total legis-
lation were enacted at the federal level in the United States by divided govern-
ments, whereas only 457 pieces were passed by unified governments.2 Hughes and 
Carlson (2015) have shown that even with respect to quality, divided governments 
have been more productive; for the same period, on average 41.7 pieces of signifi-
cant legislation were passed by divided governments, whereas 28.8 pieces were 
passed by unified government.3 In addition, these productive divided governments 
emerged the wake of intense party polarization. Data provided by Ansolabehere et 
al. (2017) and Hughes and Carlson (2015) suggest divided governments were less 
 1. Several studies have argued that a divided government combined with party polarization not 
only has a negative affect policy-making productivity but also contributes to the failure of 
presidential nominations to the executive branch to secure confirmation from the Senate 
(Derouen et al., 2005). 
 2. The 107th Congress is treated as a divided government in this article because Republicans 
did not maintain a majority in the Senate for more than one year. The data of Ansolabehere 
et al. (2017) indicates that the policy-making productivity of the 107th Congress was low 
compared with other recent Congresses. Nevertheless, divided governments were more 
productive in total legislation.
 3. In contrast, the data of Ansolabehere et al. (2017) suggests that a unified government is 
more productive with respect to significant legislation, though it is less productive in total 
legislation.
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productive than unified governments prior to the 1980s but that since then, as party 
polarization has ramped up, divided governments have been more productive.
The key to the puzzle may be the distribution of electoral benefits from poli-
cy-making production, in particular that between majority and minority party legis-
lators. As many political scientists have argued, even though good public policy is 
one of the most important goals of legislators (Fenno, 1978), they frequently 
behave as “single-minded seekers of reelection”  (Mayhew, 1974). Thus, legislators 
may not cling to their policy preferences if doing so significantly reduces the odds 
of their being reelected. Traditionally, policy-making productivity studies have 
focused on good public policy, emphasizing that the majority party’s shared inter-
ests tended to lead to legislative success in a unified government. Although divided 
governments may be less productive in conventional terms (Binder, 1999, 2003; 
Coleman, 1999; Sundquist, 1988), there are other measures of legislative success. 
Legislators may weigh their voting decisions more strategically (Arnold 1990) and 
consider shared policy preferences as well as the electoral gains from successful 
policy making as a collective good (Adler & Wilkerson, 2012; Harbridge, 2015). 
Even though legislative performance is a collective good for both majority and 
minority parties, the distribution of electoral gains from legislation varies depend-
ing on whether the government is unified or divided. Under a unified government, 
many citizens hold the majority party accountable for everything (Samuels, 2004). 
Thus, successful policy making on the part of the majority enhances its image and 
in turn negatively affects the minority party members’ odds of being reelected 
(Powell & Whitten, 1993). According to Adler and Wilkerson (2012), successful 
policy making increased the reelection chances of both parties’ legislators under a 
divided government but only that of majority party legislators under a unified gov-
ernment. Thus, the minority party may have more incentive to cooperate with the 
majority party in a divided government, thereby promoting policy-making produc-
tivity. Indeed, several studies have shown that legislators are more likely to negoti-
ate bipartisan legislation in a divided government (Harbridge, 2015; Trubowitz & 
Mellow, 2005). 
In addition, strategic policy-making decisions may be more significant in cir-
cumstances in which a high degree of party polarization obtains. In the wake of 
increasing polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties in recent 
decades, their brand names have become more critical in elections (Jacobson, 2017, 
2015; Layman et al., 2006). Party polarization has increased party loyalty of voters, 
thereby inflating the significance of party image in elections (Erikson, 2017; Jones, 
2010). As a consequence, in this scenario minority party legislators have less incen-
tive to cooperate with the majority party under a unified government. They are 
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more likely to try to thwart policy making that could improve their opponent’s 
brand. In contrast, under a divided government, they are more likely to cooperate to 
enhance their own party image.
In this respect, this study examines the effect of a divided government on poli-
cy-making productivity in an era of party polarization. Several regression tests 
indicate that divided governments may be more productive when legislators act 
with electoral benefits in mind. For example, divided governments are more pro-
ductive in the case of issues that attract a lot of public attention. Likewise, when 
the approval rating of the minority party is sufficiently high, the share of electoral 
benefits for the minority party may be greater. As a result, more laws may be enact-
ed under a divided government. However, this does not mean that a divided gov-
ernment is always more productive. Rather, a divided government is only likely to 
be more productive than a unified government when the parties are highly polar-
ized and electorally sensitive matters are at issue.
A DIVIDED GOVERNMENT AND PARTY POLARIZATION
Party polarization matters in policy making because it leads legislators to weigh 
the positive and negative effects of a divided government in distinctive ways. Basi-
cally, party polarization broadens ideological distance between political parties, 
thereby negatively affecting policymaking productivity (Jones, 2001). Neverthe-
less, the negative effect may be invariable regardless of government types because 
of currently prevalent filibusters. Party polarization has fueled filibusters in recent 
decades, and the minority party could obstruct legislation effectively in unified 
governments (Koger, 2010). According to Sinclair (2017), legislators in the U.S. 
Congress deployed the filibuster less than 30% of the time before the mid-2000s, 
but the ratio has increased to more than 50% since the late 2000s, both in periods 
during which the government has been divided as well as united. The positive 
effect of a unified government on policy-making productivity decreased because of 
filibuster threats (Barber & McCarty, 2016), suggesting that shared interests 
between the legislative and executive branches have become less significant in 
facilitating it (Brady & Volden, 2005).
Party polarization, however, may encourage policy-making productivity under a 
divided government. One effect of polarization is that party brand has become 
more important in elections, as party loyalty has increasingly tended to guide vot-
ers in House and Senate elections (Jacobson, 2015, 2017; Layman et al., 2006; 
Erikson, 2017; Smidt, 2017). As a result, legislators have had the incentive to 
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improve their image as party stalwarts and to undercut their opponent’s party image 
(Erikson, 2017; Jones, 2010). For this reason, party polarization has discouraged 
minority party legislators from participating in policy making in unified govern-
ments and instead encouraged them to cooperate in policy making in divided gov-
ernments, because in this way both majority and minority party members are able 
to acquire electoral benefits from successful policy making. 

















101 Divided 950 439 0.46 904 340 0.38
102 Divided 550 222 0.40 932 288 0.31
103 Unified 724 240 0.33 1123 328 0.29
104 Divided 919 262 0.29 1340 332 0.25
105 Divided 612 238 0.39 1187 419 0.35
106 Divided 672 249 0.37 1214 562 0.46
107 Divided 633 283 0.45 996 505 0.51
108 Unified 675 236 0.35 1221 535 0.44
109 Unified 645 229 0.36 1214 478 0.39
110 Divided 657 241 0.37 1876 674 0.36
111 Unified 696 156 0.22 1655 831 0.50
112 Divided 486 176 0.36 1608 297 0.18
113 Divided 657 202 0.31 1205 306 0.25
114 Divided 502 178 0.35 1325 286 0.22
Note: the data were based on the PIPC Roll Call Datasets (http://pipcvotes.cacexplore.org/)
Party polarization may relatively increase the weight of the divided govern-
ment’s positive effect on policy-making productivity, resulting in the divided gov-
ernment being more productive compared with the unified government. Table 1 
partly supports this argument. Even though roll call data cannot provide precise 
information about legislative behavior, table 1 indicates that minority parties partic-
ipated in more bipartisan roll calls under a divided government than under a unified 
one. The number of bipartisan roll calls was counted along with the number of roll 
calls for which majorities of both parties cast yes votes. In addition, the trend is 
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more significant in the Senate where the filibuster is available, which has the effect 
of decreasing the weight of shared interests between legislative and executive 
branches. Given sufficient party polarization, the interaction between a divided 
government and party polarization may be positive. 
Thus, it is more likely in a divided government than in a unified government 
that if electoral gains from successful policy making are sufficiently high, legisla-
tors will seek to push legislation through and that minority party legislators will 
cooperate over issues in which citizens are interested, particularly if their party’s 
approval rating is higher than that of the majority party. However, if the minority 
party’s approval ratings are not high, then even in a divided government, the distri-
bution of electoral gains from successful policy making may be asymmetric. Addi-
tionally, the effects of issues in which the public is deeply invested and of the 
minority party’s approval ratings are likely to be more significant in a polarized 
environment, thereby inflating the importance of party image in elections. 
Congressional and presidential approval ratings that may affect their reelection 
odds are also likely to be of interest to legislators. If the public’s approval of Con-
gress is sufficiently high, incumbent legislators are more likely to be reelected 
(Adler & Wilkerson, 2012), which in turn could reduce the relative weight of elec-
toral gains from successful policy making. Likewise, presidential approval is a 
valuable electoral resource of minority party legislators in a divided government 
(Mcdermott & Jones, 2003; Lebo & O’Geen, 2011). If the president’s approval rat-
ing is sufficiently high, the relative weight of electoral gains of minority party leg-
islators from policy making may decrease. As a result, high congressional and pres-
idential approval ratings negatively affect minority party legislators’ incentive to 
cooperate, thereby reducing policy-making productivity. In such circumstances, 
they also do not need to enhance party image and so can even renounce legislate 
policies that are ideologically distant from the party platform without repercus-
sions. However, party polarization weakens this relationship because it increases 
the relative significance of party approval ratings in elections compared with con-
gressional or presidential approval ratings. Thus, the net effect of high congressio-
nal and presidential approval ratings may decrease, as party polarization increases.
In addition, the relative weight of electoral gains from policy making may be 
limited if the bills in question are highly innovative and consequential. In this case, 
legislators may feel compelled to act in accordance with their ideology and to stand 
by their preferred policies. In other words, the goal of good public policy may in 
such circumstances be more important to legislators than electoral gains.
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FINDINGS
Data Format and Variables
To examine the hypotheses in the previous section, this study used data cover-
ing the period between 1981 and 2011, as the political power and the political 
behaviors of Democratic and Republican party members may not have been consis-
tent before then owing to party reforms in the 1970s that increased party power and 
gave party leaders the means to exert strong pressure on members to vote along 
party lines (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995). In addition, this study used individual 
Congresses, the 97th to the 111th instead of years as the unit of analysis to avoid 
the bias of congressional sessions, given that it is reasonable to expect that the sec-
ond congressional session would be more productive. The panel data covered 20 
major policy areas classified by the Comparative Agendas Project, which is import-
ant given my speculation that a divided government may be more productive with 
respect to the issues that interest citizens.4
The dependent variable is the number of legislative enactments over the course 
of the period from 1981 to 2011. Because qualities and quantities of laws passed 
are not identical, a count of the number of them may overestimate or underestimate 
the dependent variable. Thus, policy-making productivity studies generally mea-
sure the dependent variable by counting only significant laws (e.g., Howell et al., 
2000). In particular, a number of policy-making productivity studies have relied on 
the list of significant laws David Mayhew (1991) compiled by reviewing annual 
end-of-session wrap-up articles from the New York Times and Washington Post and 
policy specialists’ retrospective judgments (Clinton & Lapinski, 2006).5 
The fact that all the listed laws are highly important is a plus for this measure, 
since that means the units are homogenous. Nevertheless, several studies have 
relied instead on the laws passed as reported in the Congressional Quarterly Alma-
nac (CQA) (e.g., Francis & Sulkin, 2013; Ryan, 2011; Ansolabehere et al., 2017), 
but since the almanac documents many laws that have been passed in a congressio-
nal year, there is less homogeneity among them. For example, two laws recorded in 
the almanac for 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendment (P.L. 101-549) and the Global 
 4. The policy areas are macroeconomics, civil rights, health, agriculture, labor, education, 
environment, energy, immigration, transportation, law and crime, welfare, housing, 
domestic commerce, defense, technology, foreign trade, international affairs, government 
operations, and public lands. See http://www.comparativeagendas.net.
 5. The list of laws can be found on the following webpage: http://campuspress.yale.edu/
davidmayhew/datasets-divided-we-govern.
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Change Research Act (P.L. 101-606), are substantially different, the former includ-
ing 11 titles totaling 315 pages, the latter having only three titles and taking up a 
mere 10 pages. During the period of 97th-111th Congresses, approximately 24.89% 
of enacted laws were mentioned in the almanac, whereas Mayhew’s list includes 
only approximately 2% of laws. Additionally, multiple policy topics can be includ-
ed in a public law—one of the 11 titles of the Clean Air Act Amendment, for 
instance, relates to labor issues. This study weighted the laws mentioned in the 
almanac by the number of law titles and took the titles of related policies into con-
sideration. Because Mayhew’s list comprises highly innovative and consequential 
laws, a comparison between the regressions of Mayhew’s list and the laws men-
tioned in CQA provide a means of testing the idea that the relative weight of elec-
toral gains from policy making may be limited in the case of significant bills. In 
addition, this study used the total number of all public laws weighted by the num-
ber of law titles to enhance the robustness of regression results. Thus, one unit of 
“laws mentioned in CQA” and “all public laws” represents the average number of 
law titles per day.6 
One of the major independent variables in this study is party polarization. This 
study generally relied on the ideological distance between median members of Dem-
ocratic and Republican parties for this variable (e.g., Lee, 2013). Because there are 
two party medians in each congressional chamber, the union of the median ideologi-
cal intervals of the parties—that is, the distance between the more liberal Democratic 
median and the more conservative Republican median—was used as a measure of 
party polarization. The ideological distance through DW-NOMINATE scores was 
calculated.7 In addition, this study used a dummy variable for a divided government 
(1 for a divided government and 0 for a unified government) and coded the nonpresi-
dential party in a split Congress as an instance of a divided government. It also used 
the data from Gallup’s most important problem survey that illuminates issues regard-
ed as highly important by the public. The level of public approval of Congress and 
the president was measured using Gallup surveys about the job approval rating of the 
legislative and executive branches.8 Because Gallup did not measure the approval 
rating of political parties in the 1980s, this study used data from the American 
 6. The data regarding laws published in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, all public laws, 
and related titles come from the Comparative Agendas Project.
 7. Detailed data come from voteview.com.
 8. The survey questions ask whether a respondent approves or disapproves of the way 
Congress is handling its job and whether the respondent approves or disapproves of the 
way the president is handling his job.
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National Election Studies instead that calculates average feelings toward parties.9 To 
calculate the relative approval rating of the minority party, pro-minority party approv-
al subtracted by pro-majority party approval was calculated. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Measures Mean SD Min Max
Mayhew Laws 0.487 0.765 0 4
Laws Mentioned in CQA 0.0277 0.037 0 0.252
All Public Laws 0.078 0.080 0.003 0.448
Polarization 0.73 0.063 0.626 0.804
Policy Mood 64.206 2.399 59.848 68.058
Budget Situation 2.16 0.541 1.441 3.472
Bills 0.604 0.367 0.099 2.296
Most Important 
Problem (MIP) 0.045 0.092 0 0.740
(Relative) Minority 
Party Approval -0.8 6.367 -9 10
Congressional Approval 35.267 9.153 23.24 55.192
Presidential Approval 53.438 9.151 31.727 69.192
In addition, several variables were included to control extraneous factors. Tradi-
tional policy-making productivity studies have suggested that policy mood and 
budgetary situations are important factors to take into account (e.g., Binder, 2003; 
Chiou & Rothenberg, 2003; Saeki, 2009). The more liberal the atmosphere or the 
larger the budget, the more bills that can be dealt with. Following this tradition, the 
public liberalism index developed by James Stimson (1998) was inserted to control 
policy mood. Likewise, budget outlays that may indicate the size of governmental 
works were inserted in regression models. Budget data were revised to be constant 
in 2009 dollars (in trillions of dollars). An average number of bills of individual 
policy areas was also included in regression models to control the effect of the spe-
 9. The average values of previous and next Congresses were measured if there is no available 
data. For example, there is no survey data during the 109th Congress. Then, the average of 
the party approval ratings in the 108th and the 110th Congresses were measured. Detailed 
information of the ANES survey is provided its website: http://www.electionstudies.org/
nesguide/toptable/tab2b_2.htm.
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cific policy areas’ agenda sizes. Last, the personality of presidents may affect com-
munication between legislative and executive branches (Neustadt, 1990), and indi-
vidual presidency dummies were included. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
are suggested in table 2. 
Because of the format of panel data, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems were possible. In addition, the number of laws could be correlated con-
temporaneously. Because there were fewer Congresses than policy areas in the 
dataset—the number of time periods is relatively small compared to the number of 
panels—methods such as feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and Prais-Win-
ston regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) might be inappropriate 
(Hoechle, 2007), although PCSE is a better tool than FGLS (Beck & Katz, 1995). 
Instead, considering data format, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors would be more 
appropriate for this study (Hoechle, 2007).10 Fixed effects were also used to limit 
the effect of heteroscedasticity (and hidden factors from individual policy areas), 
and MA(2) was used to limit autocorrelation problems.11
Hypothesis Tests
Results in table 3 strongly support the idea that the interaction between a divid-
ed government and party polarization is positive. Models 1-2, 1-5, and 1-8 indicate 
that the coefficients of a divided government are negative, while those of the inter-
10. All regression tests in this study were reexamined with FGLS and PCSE with AR(1) and 
policy area dummies as fixed effects to enhance statistical robustness. The statistical results 
were consistent regardless of the methods, if the dependent variables were laws published 
in Congressional Quarterly Almanac and all public laws. Regarding Mayhew’s list of laws, 
however, the interactive terms of level of presidential and congressional approval were 
insignificant when using FGLS. In addition, this study reexamined Mayhew’s list using 
panel negative binomial regressions with fixed effects and lagged dependent variable, in 
spite of contemporaneous correlation, because it is a count data. In this case, almost all 
models based on Mayhew’s list showed that a divided government and its interactive terms 
were generally insignificant. Only in the case of a consideration of the most important 
problem and a highly polarized Congress was a divided government more productive 
regarding model 2-2 (p-value=.007). This result also supports the suggestion that electoral 
gains from policy making may be limited if the laws in question are highly innovative and 
consequential.
11. The length of maximum autocorrelation was determined using the autocorrelation rule 
suggested by Newey and West (1987). For this study, given the time frame of data (15 
Congresses), MA(2) is appropriate. However, the regression results were robust, even when 
the length of maximum autocorrelation was 1 or 3.
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active terms of a divided government and polarization are positive for all measures 
of policy-making productivity. In contrast, models 1-1, 1-4, and 1-7 suggest that a 
divided government is not statistically significant without interactive terms. How-
ever, the result does not imply that the effect of a divided government is null. 
Instead, the effect may vary depending on political situations, in particular, party 
polarization.12 However, even inserting the maximum value of polarization (i.e., 
.804) in the regression models in table 3, the net effect of a divided government is 
generally negative. Only regarding Mayhew’s list of laws is the net effect of a 
divided government approximately zero when polarization is maximized.
Table 3. The Effect of a Divided Government and Polarization on Legislative Productivity
Mayhew Laws
Laws Mentioned in CQA
(weighted by 
the number of titles)
All Public Laws
(weighted by 

































































































































12. The models of table 3 were reexamined with including the data of 15 more Congresses 
(82th-96th Congresses, 1951-1981). For the regression tests, both a divided government 
and the interactive term of a divided government and polarization were statistically 
insignificant. In other words, the interaction between a divided government and party 
polarization may be positive only in the recent period when polarization has been 
sufficiently high.
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n 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
R-Squared .046 .048 .051 .174 .206 .206 .252 .281 .285
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, 
autocorrelated up to two Congresses (MA(2)), and possibly correlated between policy areas. In addition, 
fixed effects were included to prevent hidden factors from policy areas. 
† Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level 
(one-tailed). 
Acronyms: GWHB (George H.W. Bush), GWB (George W. Bush), EGI (Equilibrium Gridlock Interval)
Even though results show similar policy making productivity between divided 
and unified governments, they do not support the institutional understanding of leg-
islative gridlock, which in contrast to partisan models highlight only ideological 
preferences of individual legislators (in particular those of veto pivot and filibuster 
pivot) and argues that a divided government is as productive as a unified govern-
ment (Brady & Volden, 2005; Krehbiel, 1998; Mayhew, 1991). If this argument 
was valid, the interactive term between divided government and polarization would 
be statistically insignificant. However, it is significant in models 1-2, 1-5, and 1-8. 
In addition, even when including an equilibrium gridlock interval (EGI) that indi-
cates the ideological distance between veto pivot and filibuster pivot, the regression 
results were invariable for laws published in CQA and all public Laws (models 1-6 
and 1-9); the models’ interactive terms were significant, but EGI was insignifi-
cant.13 However, regarding Mayhew’s list, EGI instead of party polarization and a 
13. The concept of EGI was developed by Keith Krehbiel (1998). This study measured EGI 
based on DW-NOMINATE scores.
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divided government was more significant. The result may imply that legislators are 
inclined to embrace good public policy (that is, the ideological stances of their 
party) if a given bill under consideration is innovative and consequential and there-
by forego the electoral benefits that might accrue from voting yes for an insignifi-
cant bill that they nevertheless are not truly in favor of. The interactive term of 
model 1-2 was less significant than those of models 1-5 and 1-8, because May-
hew’s list contains only highly innovative and consequential laws, which supports 
the idea that the relative weight of electoral gains from policy making may be lim-
ited if the bills in question are significant.
Regression results in table 3 indicate that a divided government is on average 
less productive than a unified government. However, a divided government may be 
more productive than a unified government in specific situations if party polariza-
tion is high and legislators have a lot of interest in electoral gains. To clarify the 
effect of party polarization in detail, we can examine the interaction between a 
highly polarized Congress and a divided government.
Since the mid-1990s, party polarization has sharply increased. Even though 
Newt Gingrich (R-GA) initiated the Contract with America, that moved the Repub-
lican Party in a more conservative direction, his leadership was attacked by Repub-
lican members and he was replaced by Dennis Hastert (R-IL). In the late 1990s, 
Hastert managed Congress in a less aggressive and centralized manner (Smith & 
Gamm, 2017). However, after George W. Bush became president in 2001, Hastert 
and majority leader Tom Delay (R-TX) began forcing Republican members to fol-
low the party line. Moreover, the frequency of filibuster attempts has steeply 
increased since the 2000s (Koger, 2017). In addition, compared with previous pres-
idents, President Bush attempted more unilateral actions, including constitutional 
signing statements against the Democratic opposition (Ostrander & Sievert, 2013). 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the 107th (2001-2) Congress inaugurated a 
deeply polarized period. This study used a dummy variable that indicates that the 
107th through 111th Congresses that were highly polarized.14
14. Despite that, as a robustness check, the regression models of table 3 (and also, table 4, 5, 
and 6) were reexamined with the interactive term of divided government and polarization 
instead of HPC. The results were generally consistent, though the statistical significance of 
the interactive terms were slightly lower.
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Table 4. The Effect of a Divided Government and Most Important Problems on Legislative 
Productivity
Mayhew Laws
Laws Mentioned in CQA
(weighted by 
the number of titles)
All Public Laws
(weighted by 




















































































































































































n 300 300 300 300 300 300
R-Squared .115 .162 .227 .301 .277 .332
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and fixed effects and MA(2) are used. 
† Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level 
(one-tailed).
Acronyms: MIP (Most Important Problems), HPC (Highly Polarized Congresses), GWHB (George H.W. 
Bush), and GWB (George W. Bush)
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Table 5. The Effect of a Divided Government and Minority Party Approval on Legislative 
Productivity
Mayhew Laws
Laws Mentioned in CQA
(weighted by 
the number of titles)
All Public Laws
(weighted by 




















































































































































































n 300 300 300 300 300 300
R-Squared .046 .046 .187 .217 .281 .301
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and fixed effects and MA(2) are used. 
† Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level 
(one-tailed).
Acronyms: MP (Minority Party Approval), HPC (Highly Polarized Congresses), GWHB (George H.W. 
Bush), and GWB (George W. Bush)
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Table 4 records the effects of the inclusion of the interactive terms of a divid-
ed government and the most important problems, along with the effects of the 
interactive variables of a divided government, most important problems, and 
highly polarized Congresses, which this study used to examine the effect of high 
polarization. As expected, when party polarization was sufficiently high, thereby 
increasing the importance of party image, minority party legislators were more 
likely to collaborate in a divided government. With a highly polarized Congress 
and a high number of most important problems (more than 10%, with related pol-
icies in the areas of macroeconomics, law, crime, and defense), a divided govern-
ment could be more productive. In other words, legislators tend to pass more 
laws addressing issues the attract a lot of public interest, particularly when polar-
ization is sufficiently high. 
Models 3-4 and 3-6 of table 5 suggest that a divided government is productive 
only when minority party approval is sufficiently high (>3.8) and Congress is high-
ly polarized (HPC=1). Otherwise, the relative electoral benefit from successful pol-
icy making may accrue solely to the majority party, thereby reducing the poli-
cy-making productivity of a divided government. However, the interactive term is 
insignificant in model 3-2, which implies that when policy issues are sufficiently 
innovative and consequential, minority party legislators are less likely to collabo-
rate, even if doing so might mean losing votes. In other words, when the goal of 
good public policy’ becomes much more significant than reelection, a divided gov-
ernment may be less productive than a unified government.
Table 6 indicates that the effect of a divided government on policy-making pro-
ductivity may also decrease if minority party legislators have sufficient electoral 
resources. In particular, high congressional approval ratings facilitate the reelection 
of incumbents (Adler & Wilkerson 2012). Likewise, high presidential approval rat-
ings contribute to the presidential party members’ reelection chances (Lebo & 
O’Geen 2011; Mcdermott & Jones 2003). In such circumstances, minority party 
members are less likely to collaborate. However, the negative effect of high con-
gressional and presidential approval ratings decreases as the significance of party 
image increases in the wake of party polarization. Table 6 also supports the idea 
that the positive effect of a divided government on policy-making productivity is 
relatively limited when laws are highly innovative and consequential.
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Table 6. The Effect of a Divided Government and Approval Ratings on Legislative Productivity
Mayhew Laws
Laws Mentioned in CQA
(weighted by 
the number of titles)
All Public Laws
(weighted by 
































































































































































































n 300 300 300 300 300 300
R-Squared .050 .051 .221 .230 .303 .300
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and fixed effects and MA(2) are used. 
† Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level 
(one-tailed).
Acronyms: CA (Congressional Approval), PA (Presidential Approval), HPC (Highly Polarized 
Congresses), GWHB (George H.W. Bush), and GWB (George W. Bush)
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CONCLUSION
Many policy-making productivity studies have tacitly assumed that shared inter-
ests among party members or ideological stances determine their voting behavior 
in Congress. This assumption may not be absolutely false, but it is also not abso-
lutely true. As Mayhew (1974) established, legislators are highly interested in their 
reelection. Because they are at least partly “single-minded seekers of reelection,” 
they vote strategically to maximize their chances of reelection (Arnold, 1990). 
Minority party legislators thus may have sufficient incentive to prevent bills from 
being passed that could contribute to opponent party candidates’ reelection odds in 
a unified government. In contrast, they may facilitate the passage of such bills 
under a divided government to maximize electoral gains. As a result, a divided 
government could be more productive than a unified government. 
This relationship becomes clearer following significant party polarization in the 
United States. Because prior to the 1970s party polarization was minimal, partisan 
loyalty was insignificant. Instead, incumbency was crucial in elections, and incum-
bent legislators did not need to consider party brand when casting votes on the con-
gressional floor. As a result, divided governments were less productive than unified 
governments during this time. However, with the increasing emphasis on party loy-
alty and the importance of party brand name that has accompanied party polariza-
tion, legislators have had more and more to take the party brand into account in 
voting. In this situation, the minority party in a divided government has sufficient 
incentive to pass laws. Several regression models in this study support this sugges-
tion. In particular, regarding policy areas in which electoral benefits might be sig-
nificant and political contexts in which the approval ratings of the minority party 
are sufficiently high, minority party legislators in a divided government have more 
incentive to participate in policy making. However, if minority party legislators 
have sufficient electoral resources that derive from high congressional and presi-
dential approval ratings, the policy-making productivity of a divided government 
decreases, because they have less incentive to improve party image.
Several studies on the effect of the interaction between a divided government 
and party polarization on policy-making productivity have argued that the effect is 
insignificant (e.g., Jones, 2001). Others have claimed that the interaction has nega-
tively affected policy-making productivity (e.g., Metzger, 2015). None of these 
studies, however, consider minority party legislators’ electoral gains from success-
ful policy making. Moreover, they rely on outdated data or make their arguments 
without conducting rigorous empirical tests. 
This article statistically tested the relationship using up-to-date data and found 
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that a divided government may be more productive in particular when party polar-
ization is significant and minority party legislators are highly interested in electoral 
gains. Because party polarization has increased since the 2010s, the policy-making 
productivity of a divided government could grow even more. This does not mean 
that divided governments are always more productive than unified governments. 
Only in circumstances in which significant party polarization obtains and legisla-
tors have a high interest in electoral gains are divided governments likely be more 
productive.
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